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Resumen
La política monetaria en Sudáfrica ha experimentado cambios significativos, presentando en
términos generales 3 periodos de distintos esquemas monetarios desde 1960. Este trabajo analiza el
comportamiento de la política monetaria describiéndola en términos históricos e institucionales y
formulando reglas de Taylor extendidas para la determinación de la tasa de interés. El principal
interés del estudio está en el segundo esquema monetario (previo a las metas de inflación), donde la
tasa de interés de corto plazo se convirtió en el principal instrumento de política monetaria en
respuesta a los objetivos de agregados monetarios y a los cambios en un grupo ecléctico de
variables económicas. Las políticas durante este periodo fueron más bien opacas y nunca han sido
estudiadas con modelos empíricos rigurosos. Reglas de Taylor, extendidas por la influencia de la
tasa de interés internacional y por el suavizamiento de la tasa de interés, y basadas en estimaciones
o en medidas efectivas de inflación y brecha de producto, no describen adecuadamente el
comportamiento de la tasa de interés. Modelos más satisfactorios incluyen la desviación de la tasa
de crecimiento del dinero respecto de su objetivo y controles por la extensa liberalización
financiera ocurrida durante dicho período. En la práctica, el banco central enfatiza la inflación
corriente, dándole poco peso a la brecha del producto. Se encontró evidencia débil de cambios
estructurales producto de consideraciones de balanza de pagos.
Abstract
South African monetary policy has experienced major shifts, with three broad monetary policy
regimes since the 1960s. This paper analyses the conduct of monetary policy, describing the
historical record and institutions of monetary policy, and formally modelling extended Taylor rules
for interest rate policy formation. Our principal interest is in the second regime (prior to inflation
targeting), when the short-term interest rate first became the main monetary policy instrument, with
reference to monetary targets and an eclectic set of economic indicators. Policy was opaque in this
regime, and has never been studied in the context of rigorous empirical models. Taylor rules,
augmented for foreign interest rate influences and interest rate smoothing, and based either on
forecast, or actual, inflation and output gap measures, poorly describe the behavior of the discount
rate. A satisfactory model includes the deviation of money growth from target in the rule and
controls for the extensive financial liberalisation occurring in the period. In practice, the central
bank emphasized current inflation, giving a low weight to the output gap. We find weak evidence
for structural breaks reflecting competing balance of payments considerations.
______________________
This is a revised version of the paper prepared for the Third Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile
“Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms”, Santiago, Chile, September 20-21, 1999. We are
grateful for comments from Luis Herrera and Christopher Adam, and seminar participants at Oxford and
Nottingham  Universities,  the  School  of Oriental  and  African  Studies,  and  Chatham  House.  Email:
janine.aron@economics.ox.ac.uk.1
1. Introduction
Monetary policy in South Africa's transition economy, given capital account liberalisation and
severe constraints on fiscal policy, has the major responsibility for curbing inflation and currency
instability, yet trying to ensure sufficient growth for longer-term political stability. Currently,
monetary policy is going through a rapid transition. Previously, an old-fashioned, partly
“monetarist” view assumed a simple connection between the money supply and inflation.
Accumulated international evidence does not support this, and in South Africa too, force of
circumstance has recently seen a move away from these ideas. The shift to a regime with a
publicly-announced explicit inflation goal from late 1999
1 demands good forecasting models of
inflation, using all available information to guide policy rather than one specific intermediate
target such as a monetary aggregate. Important too, is a shared understanding with the private
sector of the effectiveness of monetary policy for inflation, and greater policy transparency and
public discussion of the underlying issues (see, e.g., Leiderman and Svennson, 1995; Bernanke
and Mishkin, 1997;  Bernanke et al., 1999).
The quarterly econometric macro-model of the South African Reserve Bank  (SARB) has
not wholly been opened to outside scrutiny - by contrast with the U.K. where Treasury and Bank
of England models are published and discussed at conferences and academic panel meetings
2.
Discussions suggest that the Bank’s large macro-model
3 appeared to omit two of the most
important interest rate transmission channels: those via wealth effects, and hence domestic asset
prices; and via expectations
4. Consequently, it is difficult to take a well-informed view of the size
and dynamics of the effects of monetary policy. Further, these models gave insufficient attention
to the consequences of regime shifts, such as financial liberalisation, and, more generally, to the
highly influential Lucas Critique of the use of policy modelling, see Lucas (1976). Such defects
                                                
1 The feasibility of moving to a formal inflation targeting system was first discussed by the South African Reserve
bank in Casteleijn (1999), and by Kahn (1999).
2  An exception is a technical workshop with private sector and academic attendance, September, 1998, discussing
sectoral equations of the pre-2000 models, some of which have been published piecemeal in Quarterly Bulletins of
the Reserve Bank.
3 A model comprising 400 equations was in use until the year 2000. This has been replaced by a far smaller model
responsible for the main forecasts of the SARB (also not published).
4  The inflation sector, see Smal and Pretorius (1994), does, however, include one asset price (the exchange rate),
and a simple expectations proxy in the inflation equation, based on lagged inflation and the change in the money
supply.2
in earlier U.K. models played a major role in the costly macroeconomic policy failures of the late
1980s and early 1990s.
This paper analyses the conduct of monetary policy by the SARB, both by a description
of the historical record and by the formal modelling of various extended Taylor rules for interest
rate policy formation. The different monetary policy regimes in South Africa since the 1960s are
shown in Table 1.
The first regime was a liquid asset ratio-based system with quantitative controls on
interest rates and credit up to the early  1980s which was reformed gradually toward a cash
reserves-based system, by about 1985. Pre-announced, flexible monetary target ranges were used
from 1986, with the main policy emphasis on the central bank’s discount rate in influencing the
cost of overnight collateralised lending and hence market interest rates. Financial liberalisation
from the early 1980s, and a more open capital account in the 1990’s, had much diminished any
usefulness of such targets. They were formally supplemented by a broader set of indicators,
including the exchange rate, asset prices, the output gap, the balance of payments, wage
settlements, total credit extension, and the fiscal stance (see SARB Quarterly Bulletin, October,
1997). It is likely that such indicators played a role in prior years too. However, it has never been
made clear what weights attach to them, nor how such weights may have changed, for instance,
in the face of external shocks.
From early 1998, a new system of monetary accommodation was introduced with daily
tenders of liquidity through repurchase transactions. Monetary growth guidelines continue to be
announced, on a three-year rather than an annual basis. Target ranges of 1-5 percent for core
inflation were informally announced from 1998. With the institution of an inflation targeting
regime, an explicit target of 3-6 percent by the year 2002 (average) for a new CPI measure
5 was
announced in the Budget Speech of February, 2000. It is not clear what factors influenced this
choice of target range. However, policy appears to be evolving towards greater transparency,
aiming to improve credibility and to achieve a more pronounced effect on inflationary
expectations.
Our principal interest in this paper is in the second of these regimes (prior to inflation
targeting), when the short-term interest rate first became the main monetary policy instrument of
                                                
5  The new measure is CPIX inflation, or overall CPI (metropolitan and other urban areas), excluding interest rates3
the SARB. Monetary policy setting was particularly opaque in this regime, and has never been
studied in the context of rigorous empirical models. It is not clear which indicators in practice
influenced interest rate policy, nor what weights attached to them. Our aim is to clarify the
historical record.
Further, despite the major changes in policy now in process and prospect, continuities
with past policies are inevitable. The new interest policy rules under inflation targeting can be
seen as variants, using different weights, of the interest rate feedback rules we have found to
describe past  behaviour. Our analysis helps to understand the likely continuities as well as
changes in policy. Moreover, many structural economic features persist across different regimes.
Section 2 describes the institutions of South African monetary policy: the central bank,
monetary policy regimes and operating procedures, exchange rate regimes and the capital
account, and targeting policies. Section 3 gives narrative evidence across particular episodes on
how policy has operated in practice. Periodically, major shocks in the form of significant gold
price changes and political crisis or change resulting in large changes in capital flows, have
complicated monetary management.
Section 4 analyses quarterly extended Taylor rules as quantitative descriptions of
monetary policy in the 1986-1997 period (using our own forecasting models to 1998 for output
and inflation, to derive efficient instruments). The basic Taylor rule with partial adjustment and
incorporating a foreign interest rate gives a poor description of policy.  Indeed, at face value,
such a rule suggests an apparently perverse policy with respect to inflation. However, this ignores
reactions of interest rates to excess money growth, which is found significant in a further
extension of the model, reducing the apparent perversity of interest policy with respect to
inflation. We show that a satisfactory policy description needs to control for financial
liberalisation, which, with the removal of quantitative controls on interest rates and credit and
restrictions on competition, was associated with a substantial rise in real interest rates in South
Africa after 1980.  Weak evidence was found for structural breaks reflecting balance of payments
considerations. Even with the more satisfactory model, it is plain that forecast inflation received
a low weight in the reaction function in the 1986-1997 period.
Section 5 summarises and concludes.
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2. Institutions of South African Monetary Policy
2.1 The South African Reserve Bank
The legal independence of the SARB is guaranteed by the South African Constitution (approved
by the Constitutional Court in December, 1996), which states: “The primary object of the SARB
is to protect the value of the currency in the interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth
in the Republic. The  SARB, in pursuit of its primary object, must perform its functions
independently and without fear,  favour or prejudice, but there must be regular consultation
between the Bank and the Cabinet member responsible for national financial matters.” The
constitution can only be altered with a two-thirds parliamentary majority; otherwise, any attempt
to alter the independence or objectives of the SARB would be contested in the Constitutional
Court. Prior to 1996, de facto the central bank operated largely with autonomy, though it was not
at all times immune from political interference. Arguably the Constitution formalised the stated
ultimate goal of monetary policy between 1989 and 1995, that of low inflation (e.g.  Stals,
September, 1995).
The Constitution further clarifies that the  SARB is regulated in terms of an Act of
Parliament, which determines the exact powers and functions of the SARB, and the conditions
governing their exercise or performance. Both the transparency and the accountability of
monetary policy, as regulated by the Reserve Bank Act (1989, with subsequent amendments),
have improved with the move to inflation targeting in 1999/2000. The Act requires the
publication of monthly statements of assets and liabilities and submission of an annual report to
Parliament, and, periodically, the Governor appears before the Standing Committee on Finance.
However, during the policy regime with loose monetary guidelines, the Act was not explicit on
which level of inflation offered sufficient price stability, the rate with which it should be
achieved, and with whom the ultimate responsibility for price stability rested. Thus, there were
no explicit benchmarks against which the performance of the  SARB could be judged,
diminishing accountability. By contrast, in the new inflation targeting regime, the Ministry of5
Finance has specified for a particular price index a target range of 3-6 percent, to be reached on
average for the year 2002. This is the clear responsibility of the Monetary Policy Committee of
the SARB.
6
Since its establishment in 1921, the SARB has been privately owned. The shares are
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and there is a ceiling on the number of shares that
may be held. After transfers to reserves, dividend payments and other provisions, the surplus of
earnings is paid to the government. The Reserve Bank Act (1989) states that the  SARB’s
management and functions are the ultimate responsibility of the SARB’s full Board of Directors,
which comprises 14 members
7, and which meets four times a year at present. The minutes of
Board meetings are not published.
In practice, by law, the operation of the main monetary policy tool between 1986 and
1999, the setting of the level of the Bank rate, was at the behest of the Governor, after
consultation with the Deputy Governors (see sections 2.3 below) 
8. Minutes of these meetings
were not published. The Minister of Finance could also be consulted, but policy could be altered
without his approval, and further, minutes of his meetings with the SARB were not published.
The Governor and three Deputy Governors are appointed for terms of five years by the State
President
9. Typically the tenure has been longer than this
10, which may have enhanced the
independence of the SARB, but potentially concentrated power in the hands of too few.
Apart from monetary policy resting in the hands of a few or ultimately one person,  the
process by which these decisions were arrived at between 1986 and 1999 is unclear. As shall be
seen below, a wide range of intermediate variables, such as private credit growth, and the level
                                                
6 There are, however, currently some weaknesses in the institutional design of the SARB’s inflation targeting regime,
which may compromise transparency and accountability. Notably, there are no explicit legislated rules for breaching
targets, as for the Bank of England, but rather a vague provision to make allowance for exogenous supply shocks
(SARB, April 6, 2000, point 3.4).
7   The Governor, his three deputies, three further officials appointed by the Government, and seven individuals
elected by the SARB’s private share-holders (four representing finance or commerce, two for industry and one
representing agriculture).
8  This arrangement continues, de jure, under the inflation targeting regime, where the Governor and Deputy
Governors are the sole voting members of the 15 member Monetary Policy Committee, with the final decision-
making power on monetary policy. In practice, however, the decision on interest rate policy is reached by consensus
after extensive discussions by the committee; and the Monetary Policy Statement of the Monetary Policy Committee
is drafted by the entire committee. Unlike the Bank of England, the minutes of these meetings are not published.
9  Governors may be dismissed by the Minister of Finance but currently only for malfeasance or incapacity.
10  Governors De Jongh (1967-80), de Kock (1981-89) and Stals (1989-99), and Deputy Governor de Swardt (1990 -
), have all exceeded the five year tenure. The new Governor, Mboweni began his term in August, 1999.6
and changes of reserves, have in recent years supplemented the money growth ”guidelines” in
influencing interest rate decisions aimed at lowering inflation. However, it is not known which
weights applied to these indicators in the interest rate rule, nor how these weights changed after
exogenous shocks or policy regime changes. This rendered policy quite opaque.
2.2 Exchange Rate Regimes
11
South Africa's exchange rate policy during the 1970s mirrored volatile developments on the
international front, and throughout the period there were a number of significant regime shifts
(see Appendix 1). Until 1979, the exchange rate was fixed, pegging the rand either to the U.S.
dollar or to the U.K. pound. Alterations in the rate were determined by policy-makers, and took
the form of discrete step-changes. Exchange controls restricted residents’ capital flows, while the
sale of assets by non-residents were placed in blocked rand accounts, which made the repatriation
of capital difficult. In 1976, the system was modified to allow for the transfer of assets between
non-residents.
Greater flexibility was introduced in 1979 with a dual currency exchange rate system,
following the recommendations of the interim De  Kock Commission (1978). An official or
commercial exchange rate was announced on a daily basis in line with market forces. The second
exchange rate, the financial rand, applied to most non-resident portfolio and direct investment,
with all other transactions being channelled through the commercial rand market. The intended
impact of the dual system was to break the direct link between domestic and foreign interest
rates, as well as to insulate the capital account from certain categories of capital flows.
In 1983, the commercial rate was determined in the market subject to direct intervention
by the SARB, and the dual rates were unified as recommended by the de Kock Commission
(1978, 1985). Controls on non-resident capital movements were removed; and while those on
residents remained, a more lenient attitude was taken to applications from residents for direct
investment abroad.
The unified currency remained stable for a few months, but then following the gold price
decline in 1983, the currency began a sharp descent. In 1985, following a prolonged period of
                                                
11  This section draws on Aron, Elbadawi and Kahn (2000).7
political upheaval, American banks recalled their loans, precipitating a debt crisis, followed by a
debt standstill, and subsequently a series of four debt rescheduling agreements. The unified rand
fell even further, and eventually the financial  rand was reintroduced and capital controls on
residents were tightened. The dual currency system remained in existence until its unification a
decade later in March 1995, into a managed float. The nature of the SARB’s varying, implicit
exchange rate targets are discussed in section 2.4.
2.3 Monetary Policy Regimes and Operating Procedures
There have been three broad monetary policy regimes since the 1960s (Table 1 and Appendix 1).
Our quantitative interest rate models focus on the second of these. The first regime was a liquid
asset ratio-based system with quantitative controls on interest rates and credit, operated until the
early 1980s. A low degree of importance was attached to the interest rate as a corrective tool, the
main form of monetary control being the use of liquid asset requirements. Commercial banks
held particular assets defined as “liquid” as a specified minimum proportion of deposits
(Appendix 1). The limited supply and low yields of these assets were expected to curtail bank
lending and money supply growth. From 1978, the SARB tied their accommodation rates at a
margin above the market rates of the previous week (this practice ceased in December, 1983).
The result was an upward “ratcheting” of interest rates during money market shortages (with
banks in need of accommodation): market rates were following accommodation rates, which in
turn, were following market rates (de Kock Commission, 1978, 1985). Since the main instrument
of credit control was direct limits on the banking system, there was a large degree of
disintermediation, particularly between 1976 and 1980, distorting the credit supply figures.
Increasing dissatisfaction with the liquid asset ratio system, saw a range of reforms
enacted from the early 1980s (Appendix 1), toward a cash reserves-based system following the
recommendations of the de Kock Commission Reports (1978, 1985). The removal of some direct
controls (abolition of deposit rate controls) in March 1980, and bank credit ceilings later that
year, resulted in reintermediation and a decline in the velocity of circulation. There were also
technical changes on assets requirements over a few years (Appendix 1), and a redefinition of the
role of the discount rate. This second regime was in full operation by mid-1985.8
Under the cash reserves system, pre-announced monetary targets
12 were used for the first
time from 1986 (details in section 2.4), to be achieved indirectly through adjusting interest rates.
The main policy emphasis was on the central bank’s discount rate in influencing the cost of
overnight collateralised lending and hence market interest rates.
In practice, to reduce the demand for bank credit, the SARB increased the bank interest
rate at which it provided discount-window accommodation to banking institutions against the
collateral of various government bills. The supply of credit (a major component of money supply
changes in South Africa) could be influenced by open market operations and various other
policies acting on overall liquidity.
13 By creating a persistent “money market shortage” and
setting the Bank rate at a relatively high level, the commercial bank rates were typically closely
linked to the Bank rate. According to the  SARB, monetary control thus operated indirectly
through the slowing of the demand for money, with an estimated lag for its ultimate effect on
inflation of over twelve months (e.g. Stals, September, 1995).
 In early 1998, a third system of monetary accommodation was introduced, operating
daily tenders of liquidity through  repurchase transactions. Monetary growth guidelines
continued to be announced, as well as an inflation target (see section 2.4). Extensive financial
liberalisation and innovation in the domestic financial sector had much diminished any
usefulness of the monetary targets. The government also wished to avoid the political sensitivity
of direct interest rate setting under volatile capital flows, The repurchase interest rate is market-
determined in auctions. In theory, rather than controlling the cost of liquidity through setting the
discount rate, the operation of monetary policy effectively rations the quantity of liquidity. The
SARB signals its policy intentions on short term interest rates to the market through the amount
offered at the daily tender for repurchase transactions (see SARB Quarterly Bulletin, June, 1999).
A full provision of the estimated daily liquidity requirement of banks indicates a neutral position,
while marginal over- or under-provision of the estimated liquidity requirement signals that the
SARB would prefer the repurchase rate to  stabilise at prevailing levels. Significant over- or
under-provision of liquidity signals a preference for movement in the repurchase rate, the degree
of which depends on the extent of rationing. Auctions with a predetermined fixed interest rate,
much used in the early days of the new system, now only operate under exceptional
                                                
12  In 1990, the term “money supply targets” was replaced by “money supply guidelines”.9
circumstances, in order to obtain an immediate and substantial change in money market interest
rates (e.g. in the face of large external shocks). However, in practice there has been little
difference in interest rate  behaviour between the second two regimes: even under price
auctioning, the commercial banks collectively have remained heavily influenced by  SARB-
directed preferences for the level of the interest rate.
2.4 Explicit Monetary and Implicit Exchange Rate Targets
Monetary targets
Explicit monetary growth targets for M3, a broad definition of money
14, were announced
annually during 1986 to 1998, following the recommendations of the de  Kock Commission
(1985).
15 The choice of M3 centred on its supposedly relatively stable relationship over time to
current GDP, that it was more insensitive than other money aggregates to disintermediation and
reintermediation, and, being so broad, that it reflected changes in the budget deficit, private credit
extension and the balance of payments. Target ranges were set annually using a three-month
moving average of M3, and were announced in the March Budget to cover the period from the
fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the current year.
The setting of the target aimed both to accommodate projected real GDP growth and to
contain inflation, though the procedure used to choose the target was not transparent. As with the
Bundesbank (Clarida and Gertler, 1997), these targets were intended as guidelines, rather than
strict rules. The SARB had discretion to breach targets, for instance in the face of external trade
and financial shocks. There was no penalty for breaching targets; nor was there a legally-required
public rationalisation when breaching targets (as for the Bundesbank).
Financial  liberalisation from the  1980s, and a more open capital account after 1995
diminished any usefulness of the M3 targets. The target growth zones and money growth
outcomes for 1986-98 are given in Figure 1. Large deviations are apparent during the 1980s, and
persistent overshooting from 1994 onwards, after the resurgence of capital inflows to South
                                                                                                                                                             
13   More than one discount window
14   M3, newly defined for targeting purposes, is a broad definition of money, including notes and coins held by the
public, plus all types of deposits, short, medium and long-term, of the domestic private sector with South African
banking institutions.
15 As of March, 1998, M3 growth guidelines have operated over a 3 year rather than annual basis.10
Africa. From the 1990s the guidelines were supplemented by an eclectic set of indicators,
including the exchange rate, asset prices, output gap, balance of payments, wage settlements,
total credit extension, and the fiscal stance (SARB Quarterly Bulletin, October, 1997). It is likely
that such indicators played a role in earlier years, though it has been pointed out that the relative
weights and their alteration over time (e.g. with external shocks) are not known.
Exchange rate targets
From 1979, the SARB engaged in active intervention in both spot and forward foreign exchange
markets, although low levels of reserves at certain times limited its extent. There is some
evidence that during 1979-1988, exchange rate intervention was directed at maintaining
profitability and stability in the gold mining industry by smoothing the real rand price of gold
faced by producers, despite large fluctuations in the dollar price of gold (Kahn, 1992)
16.
From August, 1989, under a new Governor, Stals, the SARB appeared to be active in
stabilising the real effective exchange rate, partly out of concern for the international
competitiveness of South Africa's manufacturing exports. This aimed to prevent excessive
appreciation of the real exchange rate when the nominal exchange rate was tending to appreciate.
There was, however, no explicit official policy to stabilise the real exchange rate.
Political uncertainty after 1992 began to put increased pressure on the exchange rate. In
the uncertain atmosphere prior to the elections of April, 1994, there were huge capital outflows.
Despite borrowing from the IMF and significantly increasing other short-term foreign borrowing,
the SARB was unable to prevent a nominal effective depreciation of close to 19 percent between
January, 1993 and July, 1994 (real depreciation was about 10 percent). After the election, capital
inflows resumed strongly, particularly when exchange controls on foreign investors were lifted
with the unification of the dual exchange rate system in  March, 1995. There was heavy
intervention in both spot and forward markets to prevent appreciation of the rand, at the expense
of monetary targets (see Stals, October, 1995). During the 21 months from the elections the
nominal bilateral rand/dollar exchange rate moved by no more than 2 percent from R3.65/$,
while in April, 1995 to January, 1996, the range was even narrower, moving in an "implicit"
                                                
16  It was only after December, 1988, and for a limited period between September 1983 and January 1985, that the
Reserve Bank paid the gold mines in dollars (50 per cent of gold production was paid in dollars during 1983-85) and
reduced its role in the foreign exchange market.11
band of R3.65" 1 percent. The stylised fact of the steady bilateral rate in the face of huge inflows
was viewed by many investors as a "one-sided" implicit nominal target (e.g. Union Bank of
Switzerland, February, 1996). Despite large, persistent interventions on behalf of the rand, the
SARB claimed the rand was floating and that intervention was only to smooth temporary and
reversible short-term fluctuations (Stals, October, 1995). After a classic exchange rate crisis in
early 1996 with a massive loss of reserves (Aron and Elbadawi, 1999), a pattern of periodic
temporary targeting of the nominal exchange rate was apparently resumed. During 1996-1999
there was high exchange rate volatility; a currency crisis in May, 1998, again saw a large loss of
reserves in a vain attempt to defend the  rand. Under inflation targeting, such exchange rate
management is expected to have a fairly low priority.
3. A Narrative Description of Monetary Policy and Outcomes: 1980-1998
In a brief and selective review of monetary policy and outcomes over two decades, we organise
the discussion around four episodes: 1980-85, 1986-89, 1989-93 and 1994-98. In the  first
episode, under Governor De Kock
17 from 1981, credit controls were rapidly removed and liquid
asset ratios more gradually reduced from levels of close to 60 percent in the early 1980s to
around 25 percent by early 1985. The definition and use of the “Bank rate” (discount rate)
underwent important changes. During the second episode, a cash reserves-based monetary policy
system operated under De Kock, and flexible money supply targets were announced annually
from 1986. A new governor,  Stals, presided over the  third  and fourth episodes, which are
distinguished from the earlier two by less variable and consistently positive real interest rates.
The capital account was opened to non-residents after democratic elections in 1994. A period of
considerable currency volatility ensued, which helped catalyse the change to a repurchase system
of monetary policy from March, 1998.
3.1 1980q1-1985q3
                                                
17  A useful source is Gidlow (1995).12
The period of the early 1980s was complicated for monetary policy, combining major shifts in
monetary and exchange rate regimes, and a huge gold price shock. Further, the limited political
liberalisation initiated in the period led to social unrest, which received international publicity.
Approbrium for the Apartheid regime and a deteriorating sovereign risk rating was reflected in
capital outflows and  disinvestment, culminating in an international debt crisis in 1985, and
international trade and financial sanctions.
During the 1970s, annual inflation averaged 9.0 percent
18, with the principal shocks to
prices from the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks, and the sharp gold price rise from 1979
19. The use of
import surcharges over and above the tariff regime, induced a considerable tightening of trade
policy. They were first used from  April, 1977, following the cessation of capital inflows
following the Soweto riots in 1976, and remained in force until March 1980 when high gold
prices took the pressure off the current account. High import surcharges were reintroduced from
February, 1982 to November, 1983.
The SARB’s quarterly discount rate averaged 6.6 percent in the decade, declining after
the oil shocks (Figure 2). However, the main downward pressure on interest rates in 1979-80 was
due to an (unsterilised) accumulation of reserves by the SARB given the rising gold price, in an
attempt to prevent excessive appreciation of the newly floating exchange rate
20. By the first
quarter of 1980, the discount rate had reached a trough of 4.7 percent, yet with inflation at almost
15 percent. The low interest rates helped to fuel an investment boom, and later a consumer boom,
which partly dissipated the windfall gains from the boom. The ensuing current account deficits
were financed by a substantial buildup of foreign debt.
This inflationary trend was later reversed after a very sharp rise in interest rates from
1981 (Figure 2)
  21. The interest rate rise occurred in two stages. First, under a new monetary
policy regime interest rates were liberalised (Table 1 and Appendix 1), but the discount rate was
automatically tied to the market rates in the manner described in section 2. In the aftermath of the
                                                
18  Note that inflation figures are reported for the four-quarter log change in the quarterly consumer price deflator,
which is the variable used in our inflation forecasting equations. This slightly understates the conventional
percentage change measurement, particularly when inflation rates are high.
19  The gold price reached a peak of $850 per fine ounce in January, 1980.
20 The exchange rate floated in a dual regime from 1979:1, see Appendix 1.
21  The average quarterly discount rate during 1980:1 to 1985:2 was 14.1 percent, while annual inflation averaged 13
percent. The quarterly real prime interest rate averaged 4.1 percent.13
gold shock in 1981-82, the ensuing money market shortage saw a “ratcheting up” of interest
rates.
In the second stage beginning in 1983, the commercial and financial exchange rates were
unified (as recommended by de Kock, 1978, 1985), removing the shield to domestic inflation and
interest rates previously provided by the dual exchange rate regime. Large capital outflows
induced a sharp fall in the exchange rate. These outflows were not sterilised. In the event, the
exchange rate unification was temporary, and was abandoned at the onset of the debt crisis in late
August, 1985.
22 The nominal effective exchange fell from 278 to 145 (1990=100) during the
unification. The feed-through to inflation became evident from late 1984, and coupled with
continuing strong consumer demand, this induced a sharp rise in interest rates, which reached
almost 22 percent in early 1985. Quarterly real prime interest rates averaged almost 10 percent
during the unification period. The  contractionary effect on the money supply, however, was
partially offset by a domestic credit expansion, fuelled by the SARB’s monetary accommodation
policies and financial liberalisation (including the removal of interest rate controls and reduction
in bank’s reserve requirements).
3.2 1985q3-1989q2
Following the debt standstill in 1985, no new foreign bank loans were forthcoming, apart from
trade credits. Coupled with the requirement to repay capital and interest on debt, this implied that
the capital account remained in deficit until 1994.
23 Continuing pressure on the capital account
required an adjustment in the economy to maintain current account surpluses of over 3 percent of
GDP (Leape, 1991). This adjustment was partly achieved by the sharp currency depreciation, and
partly by trade policy, with big increases in tariffs, and the  reimposition of large import
surcharges from September, 1985. There was a collapse of domestic investment, both private and
parastatal.
With declining investor confidence, the SARB tried to stimulate demand domestically.
                                                
22 The effect was to prevent further outflows of capital by foreign investors, except where there was matching inward
investment.
23 At the time of the debt crisis, approximately 70 percent of South Africa's debt, which amounted to 42 percent of
GDP, had a maturity of less than one year. The final 1994 Debt Arrangements provided for the full amortisation of
the affected debt by August 2001.14
Within a year of the crisis, nominal interest rates had more than halved to a trough of 9.5 percent.
Inflation continued to rise, averaging 16.4 percent in 1986, and the real interest rate entered
negative territory from 1986 for the first time in four years.
However, with rising gold prices from late 1986 through 1988, domestic investment and
growth began to increase (Figure 2), inducing a current account deficit in the second quarter of
1988. Trade policy was tightened considerably: import surcharges were increased in 1988, at
times generating more revenue than the already high tariffs. Interest rates were raised
substantially: between the first quarter of 1988 and the second quarter of 1989, the Bank rate
increased from 10.5 percent to 17 percent, in part influenced by substantial rises in world interest
rates over the same period (Figure 3). Positive growth trends were reversed. Thus, monetary
policy may have been influenced by balance of payments considerations.
Significant domestic financial  liberalisation
24 was underway by the mid-1980s, which
rapidly expanded credit growth (Figure 4). Money targets were announced from 1986 onwards.
By the end of 1986, M3 growth turned sharply upwards, and within a year had exceeded the
monetary growth target ceiling (see Figure 1). It remained outside of the target for the remainder
of this episode, beginning to decline only in the second quarter of 1989, when interest rates
reached 17 percent.
3.3 1989q3-94q1
With the accession of Governor Stals from the third quarter of 1989, real interest rates were far
less variable and consistently positive.
25 High rates were maintained with the twin objectives of
curbing inflation and maintaining a current account surplus. Nominal interest rates rose to 18
percent by the end of 1989, remaining there for a year, falling to 17 percent in 1991. Inflation
remained persistent until 1992, largely exceeding 15 percent in these years.
Balance of payment pressures moderated in the early 1990s, partly because of  prospects
of political reform under a new leadership. The high levels of import surcharges were sustained
                                                
24 The details of the financial liberalisation are characterised in section 4.3 (see also Appendix 1).
25 Until 1992, inflation displayed strong inertia, fluctuating about the 14 percent level, and with a quarterly maximum
of close to 18 percent. However, with the discount rate varying from 4.7 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1984, to
9.5 percent by end of 1986, and then 18 percent by the end of the decade, there was substantial real interest rate
variability.15
until the elections, but were phased out by the end of 1995. In the uncertain atmosphere prior to
the 1994 elections there were again huge capital outflows. Despite borrowing from the IMF and
significantly increasing other short-term foreign borrowing, the SARB was unable to prevent a
nominal effective depreciation of close to 19 percent between January, 1993 and the end of July,
1994 (real depreciation was about 10 percent).
During 1992-93, there was a gradual decline in the Bank rate to 12 percent, which level
was sustained until the elections. Note that U.S. interest rates fell strongly during 1991/92. From
late 1992, a trend decline in inflation began, with inflation reaching single figures from early
1993. The reversal was strongly connected with trade liberalisation (see Aron and Muellbauer,
2000a). Under Stals, money targets declined until the mid-1990s. Money growth fell sharply,
falling within or close to the official targets from mid-1990 until the election (Figure 1). Annual
real GDP growth fell strongly from 2.4 percent in 1989 into negative figures the next year,
recovering somewhat only in 1993, when real growth measured 1.2 percent.
3.4 1994q2-98q1
Following the democratic elections in April, 1994, the new government was committed to a long-
term development strategy for generating rapid and widely-shared growth in two highly
publicised programmes
26, and to macroeconomic stability in the short- to medium-run. The initial
assessment by international capital markets was of a sustained growth path, where the strength
and sophistication of its financial markets, a strong civil society and transparent and democratic
governance were seen as a comparative advantage of South Africa.
However, the post-election growth performance was disappointing, after the initial
upturn. Real annual GDP growth was 0.5 percent in 1998 and 2.4 percent in 1997, compared to
4.2 and 3.1 percent in 1996 and 1995, respectively. Apart from South Africa's labour market
inflexibility, trade competition and a declining gold price from late 1996, probably the most
important factor affecting the growth performance was high real interest rates
27: a direct
consequence of rapid liberalisation of the capital account and management of the ensuing large,
                                                
26 The broad goals of the earlier Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), were reinforced by the
Government's Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR), announced in June 1996.
27  See, for example the output forecasting model in Aron and Muellbauer (2000a).16
volatile capital inflows.
Capital flows to the country increased markedly after the elections, though from a very
low base following over a decade of financial sanctions. Flows accelerated with the effective
removal of exchange controls on non-residents in March, 1995, after the dual exchange rate
system was again unified. A large proportion of the inflows were short-term in nature, making
the economy vulnerable to flow reversals.
In Aron and Elbadawi (1999) it is argued that the Reserve Bank had dual objectives
during the period of large net capital inflows from April, 1994 until the first currency crisis in
February, 1996.
28 These were to contain inflation through an interest rate policy based on explicit
monetary targets, and to stabilise the nominal exchange rate, de facto by an implicit one-sided
target
29. As is well-known from the currency crisis literature, under persistent capital flows a
policy trade-off arises where sustaining an exchange rate "target" may occur at the expense of
higher inflation, higher interest rates and eventually reduced output.
There was heavy intervention in the market to prevent appreciation of the currency, at the
expense of monetary targets (Stals, October, 1995). Note that the money target floor did not alter
in this episode, while the ceiling increased in 1995, widening the band, and reflecting the
diminished status of the targets under a capital account  liberalised to inflows (section 2.4).
Sterilisation of the effects of the reserve accumulation began only late in 1994. Consequently,
large increases in the liquidity of the banking sector induced an "endogenous" financial
liberalisation, compounding recent domestic financial  liberalisation, for instance, through the
mortgage market (section 4.3). Private sector credit grew strongly, partly accounted for by
demand-led pressures from new borrowers under the new political dispensation. Adding to
balance of payments pressures was a  progressive liberalisation of  trade policy, while trade
volumes underwent large corrections with the ending of trade sanctions.
The excess money growth is evident in Figure 1. In consequence, monetary policy was
tightened considerably. The Bank rate rose sharply from 12 percent at the elections to 15 percent
                                                
28 Subsidiary goals were to withdraw from the forward foreign exchange market, and to accumulate foreign reserves
(Stals, August, 1994).
29 The objective of exchange rate stabilisation was not made explicit, nor was there an announced target for the
nominal rate. However, during the 21 months after the elections the bilateral rand/dollar exchange rate moved by less
than 2 percent from R3.65/$. This was viewed by investors as a "one-sided" implicit nominal target (e.g. Union Bank
of Switzerland, February, 1996).17
by mid-1995, minimum cash reserves requirements for banks were increased and open market
operations initiated. The trend decline in inflation, which had begun around 1992, persisted after
the elections, though with some volatility (Figure 2). Annual inflation averaged 8 percent during
1994:2-1997:4, as compared with 13.6 percent during the previous episode (1989:3-1994:1).
However, there was an increase after the elections, reaching double figures again in mid-1995.
 Towards the end of 1995, interviews suggest that foreign investors were concerned by
the widening current account deficit, apparently rising inflation, the size of domestic public debt
and the (albeit modest) real effective appreciation. Further, there was anticipation of a significant
relaxation of domestic exchange controls at the Budget (early March, 1996). In the event, the
intended decontrol package was put on hold (until July, 1997) given the currency crisis that
began in mid-February. By late April the rand had depreciated by 20 percent compared to its
level in mid-February. The Reserve Bank intervened massively to try to prevent depreciation of
the currency, and of a net cumulative intervention of US$5.3 billion (from mid-February to the
end of April), about US$3.5 billion had occurred via the forward market (CREFSA, 1996).
Later crises occurred in  October, 1996, November, 1997 and April, 1998, triggered
largely by contagion effects from the Asian crisis (and also falls in the price of gold and other
metals). After the April, 1998 crisis, in which there was also heavy intervention, the currency was
some 40 percent below its average value between the elections and the first crisis.
The Bank rate rose to 17 percent after the first crisis, and remained at that level until the
end of 1997, falling to 15 percent just prior to the April, 1998 crisis, when it was raised to over
20 percent (Figure 2). Given that inflation averaged just over 6 percent in 1998, this implied very
high real interest rates. Unsurprisingly, output was seriously reduced. While investors had
generally revised sentiments about emerging markets in the aftermath of the Asian crises,
nonetheless, domestic factors such as the widening current account deficit and poor growth
prospects damaged investor confidence in South Africa.
4. Interest Rate Rules: Specification and Estimation
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4.1 Simple Interest Rate Rules
A substantial literature has accumulated on the “Taylor Rule”, (Taylor, 1993)
30, as a description
of interest rate setting behaviour by central banks with some autonomy over monetary policy
31.
The simple Taylor Rule characterises an interest rate feedback policy that is a linear function of
the deviation between inflation and target inflation, and the output gap (that is, a measure of the
deviation of output from capacity or trend output):
( )
* * * ) ( t t t t y y i - + - + = g p p b a (1)
where 
* p a + ” r ,  b > 1 and g > 0 . The target interest rate defined by the rule is 
*
t i ,  r is the
long-run equilibrium real interest rate, 
* p is the target inflation rate, yt is real output and 
*
t y  is
trend output.
32 Inflation adjusts gradually to its target via the adjustment of real interest rates; and
with b > 1, the nominal rate adjusts more than 1:1 with inflation. The role of the output gap is to




There is a large literature on optimal control in dynamic, stochastic macroeconomic
equation systems, going back to Phillips (1954). Optimal control policies for anything but the
simplest systems tend to be sensitive to model  mis-specification, and are complex and non-
transparent. Since an important ingredient of stabilisation policy is to influence private sector
expectations, recent research has instead emphasised simple, robust rules, more easily understood
by the private sector. Thus, part of this research effort has been devoted to finding “good”
parameter values for particular classes of relatively simple linear feedback rules.  Policy
simulations with macroeconometric models for a range of countries suggest that variants of the
                                                
30 Related early work is due to McCallum (1988), while Henderson and McKibbon (1993) examine a similar rule to
equation (1) below.
31  See Taylor (1999).
32 In practice, Taylor (1993) used a backward-looking measure of inflation: the deviation between inflation of the
past year and target inflation. He did not estimate the rule for the U.S., but used judgement to suggest that parameter
values of b = 1.5 and g = 0.5 forr = 2 and 
* p = 2 well-described U.S. interest rate policy for 1987-92.19
Taylor Rule have desirable stabilisation properties, see for example, Taylor (1999) and Levin et
al (1999).
We present a generalised and forward-looking version of the Taylor rule due to Clarida et
al (1998a), which nests the simple Taylor rule and other variants as special cases.  The
importance of forward-lookingness in monetary policy has recently been emphasised by Batini
and Haldane (1999), and in practice is highly relevant in inflation-targeting countries
33. The target
for the nominal short-term interest rate, 
*
t i , is given by
( ) ( ) ] | [ ] | [ ] | [
* * *
t t t t t t n t t z E y y E E i i W + - W + - W + = + x g p p b (2)
where E is the expectation operator and  t W  is the central bank’s information when setting
interest rates at time t, i  is the long-run equilibrium nominal interest rate,  n t+ p is the forecast rate
of inflation between t and t+n, yt is real output,
*
t y and
* p are desired output and target inflation,
and the zt are additional variables which may have an influence on policy.
Much of the Taylor rule literature has focused on the U.S., a large closed economy.
Inclusion of the zt variables can be motivated by  modelling considerations from small, open
economies, or by the use of money targets by the country in question. Candidates for the zt
variables thus include foreign interest rates, the money supply (or its deviation from an
announced target) and real exchange rates (or the deviation of nominal rates from an announced
target).
34
The case for including foreign interest rates is the following. For small open economies
subject to some degree of international capital mobility, domestic interest rates will necessarily
tend to follow foreign rates if the domestic monetary authority wishes to stabilise the nominal
exchange rate. In the extreme case of perfect capital mobility, by the uncovered interest parity
condition, international interest rate differentials reflect expected changes in the nominal
exchange rate and risk premia. Analogously, for a monetary authority wishing to stabilise the real
                                                
33 Note that Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) argue that there are circumstances where backward-looking rules can
work well. In their example, private agents are forward-looking, believe that the central bank will adhere to its rule,
and that economic activity depends on expected future interest rates or long rates, and not just on current short rates.
34 Clarida et al (1998) also examine lagged inflation (to test the simple Taylor rule against their forward-looking
specification).20
exchange rate, domestic real interest rates will tend to follow foreign real rates, see Taylor
(1995), p.16. Recent literature emphasises the importance of exchange rate targets, implicit or
otherwise, in small open economies. Indeed, the role of the exchange rate increases in importance
in policy formulation, the shorter the inflation target horizon, see Ball (1999).
Clarida et al (1998a) emphasise the importance of the parameter b in evaluating policy
rules. The implicit real interest rate target corresponding to equation (5) is
( ) ( ) ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ) 1 (
* * *
t t t t t t n t t z E y y E E r r W + - W + - W - + = + x g p p b (3)
where 
*
t r  is the target for the real short-term interest rate and r  is the long-run equilibrium real
interest rate. The target rate adjusts relative to the equilibrium interest rate when inflation or
output deviates from target. If b exceeds 1 (as in the simple Taylor specification, equation (1)),
the target rate adjusts to stabilise inflation and output; while if b is less than 1, the target rate
accommodates changes in inflation (real interest rates fall).
One widely adopted modification of the Taylor rule is to permit the central bank to
smooth changes in the interest rate. Central banks typically try to avoid interest rate volatility, to
promote financial market stability, and loss of credibility from interest rate reversals (e.g.
Mishkin in Taylor, 1999, p. 247). Clarida et al (1998a) assume a partial adjustment of the central
bank’s rate to the target rate as follows:
  t t t t i i i u r r + + - = -1
* ) 1 ( (4)
where  t u is a random shock. Equation (2) can be simplified by setting 
* bp a - ” i and
*
t t t y y x - ” , or
[ ] [ ] ] | [ | |
*
t t t t t n t t z E x E E i W + W + W + = + x g p b a (5)21
where  t z  includes the foreign interest rate, 
USA i  in our case. Clarida et al (1998a) suggest an
alternative interpretation of the interest rate target as the weighted average of an extended Taylor
rule and the foreign interest rate:




t t t t t t n t t i E z E x E E i W + W + W + W + - = + l x g p b a l (6)
Note that 
'
t z  now refers to other variables excluding the foreign interest rate. When a>0 and b>0,
this has the effect of raising the implied reaction to inflation in the Taylor rule, compared with
equation (5).
The combination of partial adjustment with the model in equation (5) gives:
[ ] [ ] ]} | [ | | ){ 1 )( 1 (
'
t t t t t n t t z E x E E i W + W + W + - - = + x g p b a l r
t t t
USA
t i i E u r l r + + W - + -1 ] / [ ) 1 ( (7)
Note that the special case of inflation targeting is nested within this specification, where the
weight on the output gap and zt terms is zero, and the policy rate responds only to expected
inflation (see Batini and Haldane, 1999).
4.2 Estimating an Extended Taylor Rule for South Africa
Estimating extended Taylor rules can lend insight into past policy rules, when the size of weights
applied to different indicators in interest policy formation is unknown, or where policy may
deviate in practice from stated policy.
35
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  and  t e  is the error term.  The central bank’s short-term
discount rate is it, D4log pt+k is the annual rate of change of the consumer price deflator over the
horizon of k quarters and xt+m is the output gap at t+m quarters, while “F” denotes the forecast
value of these two variables using information at t-1. The horizon of k and m is at the discretion
of the central bank but will be constrained by its forecasting ability. Finally, 
USA
t i 1 - , is the foreign
short interest rate (we use the U.S. three month treasury bill rate).
We later extend the set of zt terms in this model to include money growth deviations from
announced targets, exchange rate and balance of payments effects, and also control for an
important regime shift, financial liberalisation from the early 1980s.
The SARB’s end of quarter bank discount rate was modelled using equation (8) for the
period 1986Q2 to 1997Q4, using an instrumental variables (IV) technique to instrument forward-
looking expectations
36. The discount rate, scaled by 100, is shown in Figure 2. Four alternative
horizons were selected.
37  The first gives a backward-looking model where k = m = 1.  This can
be estimated by OLS.  The second uses contemporary inflation and output gaps, k = m = 0.  The
IV estimation is used on the conservative assumption
38 that the Bank’s information set is dated t-
1.  The third model uses forward-looking inflation and the current output gap.  Thus, k = 3,
implying the 4 quarter ahead inflation rate seen at t-1, and m = 0.  The final specification takes
forward-looking versions of both, k = m = 3.
Our models of the discount rate are estimated only from 1986, for two reasons. First, the
transition in the early to mid-1980s from a liquid assets system to a cash reserve system of
monetary control was not accomplished immediately, and liquid asset requirements were reduced
                                                                                                                                                             
35 For instance, Clarida and Gertler (1997) argue that despite the Bundesbank’s claims to base interest rate policy
largely on ensuring that monetary growth falls within specified target ranges, a modified Taylor rule provides a better
description of its actual behaviour.
36  Clarida and Gertler (1997) use generalised method of moments to estimate the parameter vector for a Taylor rule
similar to equation (8).
37  Note that in estimating equation (8) we assume that over the short horizon, short-term interest rates and inflation
are I(0). The evidence is given in Table 3. Note that the augmented Dickey-Fuller has low power against the
alternative of stationarity over the short sample.
38  This is approximately correct for National Accounts’ information, though this is subject to revision.  Information
on prices and money and credit aggregates tends to be available with lags of a few weeks or less, while information
on interest rates is almost instantaneous.23
only gradually during 1980-85 from the abnormally high levels prevailing in 1980 (section 2).
The formal monetary growth target ranges were introduced for the first time in 1986. Secondly,
during the debt crisis of 1985, interest rates were raised to extraordinary levels in a vain attempt
to attract foreign capital inflows and prevent debt default. Clearly a Taylor rule will fail to
describe the shock of 1985.
The output gap is constructed using an extended version of stochastic trend models of the
type recommended by Harvey (1993), see also Harvey and Jaeger (1996). This can be estimated
using the STAMP programme of Koopman et al (1995).  We used several different measures of
the output gap. For the first measure, the model has the following form:
log yt = a0 + STOCHt + a1log yt-1 + SbjXjt + et                                           (9)
where yt is real GDP and STOCHt is a smooth stochastic trend reflecting the underlying capacity
of the economy to produce. The Xjt capture cyclical factors: we use distributed lags of changes in
log capacity utilization and changes in the log real gold price for an estimation period of
1973Q1–1998Q4.  The stochastic trend is defined as a moving average of a moving average of
random shocks. More precisely, STOCH is an I(2) variable which requires twice-differencing to
give a stationary series,
D
2STOCHt = ht  (10)
where ht is a random shock. The technique gives good results and is to be preferred to the
widely-used Hodrick-Prescott filter, because it does not rely on any arbitrary calibration of the
variance of the underlying shocks ht, see Harvey and Jaeger (1996) for discussion.  Instead, all
the parameters of the model are estimated from the data.
39
                                                
39  Standard augmented Dickey-Fuller tests suggest that over 1973-1998, log(yt) is I(1), implying that Dlog(yt) is a
stationary variable. The combination of equation (8), where the Xjt are clearly I(0), and equation (9), appears to
contradict this, since STOCHt is I(2).  However, the hypothesis that a variable such as log(yt) is I(1) is hard to
distinguish from alternatives e.g. that log(yt) has a large autoregressive component and is stationary about a
deterministic trend, or a deterministic trend with a change in trend at some point in the sample. A low variance I(2)
stochastic trend resembles the latter. In other words, the hypothesis that log(yt) is I(1) is quite hard to distinguish
from the alternative of I(0) on the one hand, and I(2) on the other, when the I(2) component is a smooth, low
variance series.24
The resultant output gap, defined as  ) 1 /( ) (log 1 0 a a - - - t t STOCH y , was used to
construct the first output gap measure,  OUTGAP1 (Figure 2). This trend was compared in
estimations with the alternatives of a cubic function of time and with split time trends. For almost
all specifications reported below, the output gap derived from the stochastic trend model gives a
better fit than these two alternatives. The second measure of the output gap, OUTGAP2, is also
shown in Figure 2, and employs a stochastic trend from a richer model of output in Aron and
Muellbauer, 2000a.
40 The principal differences between the two measures occur in the aftermath
of the 1980/81 gold price shock and the smaller price shock in 1987, when OUTGAP2 indicates
lower excess capacity in the economy; and after 1994, when OUTGAP2 indicates a higher excess
capacity.
41
We also used two models for forecast inflation to derive instruments for the interest rate
rule. A simple forecasting inflation model, similar in conception to the SARB models used at the
time, was derived from a model linking consumer inflation, respectively, one-quarter- and four-
quarters-ahead, with lags in consumer price and wholesale price inflation, wage changes, money
growth, interest rate changes and the output gap. This model does not have an equilibrium
correction form so that relative price levels play no role. A more sophisticated model is described
in detail in Aron and Muellbauer (2000a).
42
                                                
40 This is a four-quarter-ahead forecasting model for the log of real GDP. The model uses a stochastic trend to
measure long-run changes in the capacity to produce. On the demand side there are important negative interest rate
effects, though these have been altered by changes in the monetary policy regime. The trade surplus and government
surplus to GDP ratios, which also respond to interest rate changes, and improvements in the terms-of-trade, all have a
positive effect on future output. The deviation of output from the four-quarter lag of the stochastic trend defines the
output gap.
41 The main economic reason is the inclusion of the real interest rate amongst the economic variables. This variable
is  I(1), and in the 1990s, rose strongly, depressing output, in part through contracting capital accumulation.
Conceptually, therefore, OUTGAP2 differs from OUTGAP1. In recent years, a demand boost from lower interest
rates would generate more inflation using the OUTGAP1 measure. The OUTGAP2 measure effectively implies that
capacity would respond to lower real interest rates so reducing the inflationary pressure.
42 The four-quarter-ahead inflation model has an equilibrium correction form, which clarifies medium- or longer-run
influences on inflation, including opening the economy to foreign imports. This model implies that if consumer
prices deviate from the trend of wholesale prices, an adjustment process tends to bring them closer together again.
Further, when the real exchange rate is high, domestic price setters find it harder to push through price rises. The
nominal exchange rate affects inflation through both these channels since wholesale prices are strongly linked to
import prices. The model confirms the importance of the output gap and the influence from recent changes in the
current account surplus to GDP ratio, both of which are sensitive to short-term interest rates. However, a rise in
interest rates can also raise inflation in the short-run, via a rise in mortgage interest payments (a component of the
consumer price index). The one-quarter-ahead inflation forecast derives from the four-quarter-ahead forecast made
three quarters ago, updated using the intervening information on consumer prices, wholesale prices and foreign
inflation.25
The results of estimating the extended Taylor rule in equation (8) for the four horizons are
shown in Table 4 (the set of instruments is shown beneath the table). The South African discount
rate and the annual log-change in the consumer expenditure deflator, our measure of annual
inflation, are shown in Figure 2. The foreign interest rate, taken as the three-month treasury bill
rate for the U.S., and other South African interest rates are shown in Figure 3.
The results are striking. In all specifications the interest rate has a strongly significant
negative response to domestic inflation, whether lagged or forward-looking. At the least this
suggests some important omitted factors which influence short interest rates in South Africa. The
U.S. treasury bill rate is always significant, and the hypothesis can be accepted that, ceteris
paribus, a one percentage point rise in the U.S. rate is eventually followed by a more than one
percentage point rise in the South African rate
43. The output gap is always significant. If the U.S.
nominal interest rate is excluded, the fit of the model deteriorates markedly. There was little
difference between using the more sophisticated and simpler forecasting inflation models as
instruments, and we report results for the former. We tested robustness over both measures of the
output gap, and for a narrower set of instruments, and found very similar results in each case.
It would appear, therefore, that in the 1986-1997 period, the SARB was concerned with
stabilising output: that is, it raised interest rates when output or prospective output was above
trend. However, it apparently moved interest rates perversely with inflation or prospective
inflation. This seems not to be the most obvious way of controlling inflation, though to the extent
that the output gap is a cause of subsequent inflation, the focus on the output gap is likely to have
been beneficial. However, a specification test for columns 2 to 4, Table 4, of over-identifying
restrictions rejects all the specifications.
44
4.3 Further Extensions of the Taylor Rule
                                                
43  In all specifications, the addition of the real U.S. treasury bill rate, defined as the nominal rate less annual U.S.
CPI inflation, produces an insignificant, negative coefficient. Also note that the U.S. interest rate is defined as a
period average, while the quarterly South African discount rate is measured at the end of each quarter. The
implication is that the U.S. interest rate dated t is potentially part of the relevant information set of the SARB. We
tested for this but found it insignificant.
44  The test compares the fit of the unrestricted reduced form regression of the dependent variable on all the
instruments, with the fit obtained when the endogenous explanatory variables in equation (8) are replaced by their
fitted values from ancillary regressions of these variables on the instruments.26
Since, on the evidence just presented, the extended Taylor rule represented by equation (8)
clearly makes little sense for South Africa, further extensions of the set of zt terms in equation (6)
were considered.
Extensions of the Taylor Rule for Excess Money Growth
Since the SARB declared its official policy to be one of following monetary growth targets from
1986, one can include the deviation of actual monetary growth from the announced target (taking
the latter to be the average of the upper and lower ranges set for the guidelines – see Figure 1).
Some experimentation suggested that the annual monetary growth deviation perceived at t-1 was
a better measure than the current growth measure (instrumented appropriately).  The results are
shown in Table 5.  The new monetary target term has a significantly positive effect in all four
specifications. The fit of all the equations improve compared with Table 4.  The counter-intuitive
result of a negative inflation effect is much weaker, and indeed is insignificant in the current and
forward-looking inflation specifications. Again there was little difference between using the more
sophisticated and simpler forecasting inflation models, and between different measures of the
output gap, and for a narrower set of instruments than reported.
Although the results are less implausible than those of Table 4, the combination of results
from Tables 4 and 5 suggests that excess money growth is negatively related with recent, current
and future inflation, given the other variables in the hypothesized interest rule relationship.
Clearly the excess money growth variable in Table 5 eliminates about half the negative inflation
effect in Table 4. The test of over-identifying restrictions for columns 2 to 4 marginally accepts
the specifications.
Controlling for Financial Liberalisation in the Taylor Rule
The major changes in the financial system in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s were discussed
in section 2. The government initiated financial liberalization following the de Kock Commission
reports (1978, 1985) which advocated a more market-oriented monetary policy. Some interest
and credit controls were removed in 1980, and banks’ liquidity ratios were reduced substantially
between 1983 and 1985. Competition rose in the mortgage market following the 1986 Building
Societies Act, and amendments to the Act in 1987-88. Demutualization and takeovers in 1989-9027
consolidated the stronger competition in the credit market. In the 1990s pensions were
increasingly used to provide additional collateral for housing loans; while from 1995, special
mortgage accounts (“access bond accounts”) allowed households to borrow and pay back flexibly
from these accounts up to an agreed limit set by the value of their housing collateral. After the
1994 elections more black South Africans obtained formal employment, particularly in the public
sector, gaining access to credit that they may previously have been denied.
45 Exchange controls
on nonresidents were eliminated in early 1995: large nonresident capital inflows from mid-1994
induced a temporary endogenous financial liberalization. Finally, exchange controls on domestic
residents, in existence since before the 1960s, were partially relaxed after 1997.
With the removal of interest rate controls, credit restrictions and barriers to competition,
the supply and demand for credit have become increasingly market-determined. This has the
implication, other things being equal, that higher rates of interest are required to equilibrate the
market for credit. In Aron and Muellbauer (2000b,c), we develop a univariate indicator of the
degree of liberalization of credit markets, which we denote as FLIB. We include this indicator in
the Taylor rule as a measure of the regime change, since the Bank rate set by the SARB cannot be
immune from the effects of financial liberalisation.
An innovation in Aron and Muellbauer (2000b,c) is to treat financial liberalization as an
unobservable indicator entering both quarterly household debt and consumption equations. The
indicator, FLIB, is proxied by a linear spline function, and the parameters of this function are
estimated jointly with the consumption and debt equations (subject to cross-equation restrictions
on the coefficients in the spline function)
46. The debt and consumption equations also incorporate
a rich set of economic variables including income and income expectations, important wealth
effects and interest rate effects. The estimated parameters for FLIB in the model reflect the key
institutional changes in credit markets. Our estimated indicator shows strong rises in 1984, 1988,
and 1995, with more moderate increases in 1989, 1990, and 1996 (Figure 4). It is noteworthy that
                                                
45 Note, however, that total formal employment continued to decline.
46 We define FLIB using a non-decreasing linear spline function. Define a dummy, D, which is zero up to 1983Q4
and is 1 from 1984Q1. The 4-quarter moving average, DMA84, then takes the values 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 in the 4
quarters, respectively, of 1984, and the value 1 thereafter. We define DMA85 to be the 4-quarter lag of DMA84, and
define DMA86 to DMA97 to be the corresponding 8- to 48-quarter lags of DMA84. We then define the spline
function: FLIB = d84 x DMA84 + d85 x DMA85 + ... d97 x DMA97, where up to 14 parameters (i.e. d84 to d97)
are estimated. The spline function can shift shape in the first quarter of each year. By constraining the parameters to28
both the consumption function and debt equation are subject to major structural breaks (failing
Chow tests) when allowance is not made for financial liberalization.
The estimation results for the extended Taylor rule, equation (8), including both the
money target variable and FLIB, are shown in Table 6.  There is a dramatic improvement in the
results. FLIB has a significant positive effect in all four specifications, and the inflation effect
becomes positive throughout. The specification with current-dated inflation and the current-dated
output gap gives the strongest inflation effect, as well as the best fit, though the effect of the
output gap is weak.
47 The fit is substantially worse for the specifications with future inflation.
However, all the variables now have the expected direction of effect, with excess money growth
and the U.S. interest rate remaining significant in all specifications
48. The current output gap
tends to be insignificant when current inflation is included, and the future output gap is
insignificant when future inflation is included. Table 6 includes a selective sample of results to
indicate sensitivities to an alternate specification of the output gap, alternative inflation forecasts
and different sets of instruments. All four specifications easily pass the test of over-identifying
restrictions.
We also investigated the hypothesis that low domestic saving to GDP ratios, which might
have been expected to affect real interest rates, influenced the Bank rate. However, these effects
are insignificant when included in the Table 6 specifications.
We now interpret these results in the light of equation (7) in section 4.1, using as
representative the results from equation 2a, Table 6. The coefficient on the lagged interest rate, r,
is estimated at 0.320. This implies that the long-run coefficient on the U.S. interest rate, l, is
0.587; while b, which measures the response to domestic inflation, is 0.83. In this equation the
output gap is insignificant. Estimating the corresponding structural equation (7), which is non-
linear in parameters, by IV, and omitting the output gap, the estimated value of b is 0.87, with a
standard error of 0.19, suggesting that the hypothesis of  b=1 is acceptable.
                                                                                                                                                             
be non-negative (i.e. assuming that there is no reversal in financial liberalisation), in practice only 6 parameters are
needed to define FLIB. 
47 We compare the results both for the sophisticated inflation forecasting model (equation 2a) and a simpler model
(equation 2b), where in each case the broad set of instruments is used. The relevance of inflation relative to the
output gap is decreased for equation 2b. We found similar results for the same comparison using equation 3.
Comparing equations 4a and 4c, Table 6, which incorporate the inflation forecast at t-1, four-quarters-ahead, it is
noteworthy that the simpler model gives the stronger inflation coefficient.
48 As before, including the lagged U.S. real interest rate gives positive but insignificant coefficients.29
Extension of the Taylor Rule for Balance of Payments Constraints
As discussed in section 3, South Africa has periodically experienced major shocks to the balance
of payments from external trade shocks and political shocks: first, under a closed capital account;
and from March, 1995, under a capital account fully open to foreign flows and international
contagion. Potentially these shocks may have resulted in monetary policy being subordinated for
long periods to balance of payments considerations. We have attempted to test for such effects.
First, we examine the period after the debt crisis of September 1985 in which a debt
standstill was followed by rescheduling arrangements, in force until the debt was fully paid off in
1994. We test whether interest rates were higher in this period than could be justified simply by
the fundamentals, due to massive outflows on the capital account (including debt repayments)
and insignificant new inflows. We define a variable Z as the lagged current account surplus to
GDP ratio less a value of 3 percent, which has been suggested as the basic surplus required for
debt repayments (Leape, 1991). In Figure 5, we show Z and also ZBOP, which is defined to be
all the negative values of Z, and is the variable we include in our interest rule regression in Table
7. However, given the extensive use made of an alternative, flexible trade policy instrument to
suppress import demand - high import  surcharges  exceeded tariff rates in many years (see
section 3) - one may not expect to see much of an effect from ZBOP. The result is shown in
column 2, Table 7: while the coefficient is negative, it is not significant, and is difficult to
distinguish from the effect of a dummy set equal to 1 over the period.
We also tested for an implicit bilateral exchange rate target from the second quarter of
1994 until the first currency crisis of February, 1996 (see section 2.4), but were unable to find an
effect over this short period of 6 quarters. However, there was some evidence (t ratio of 1.8) for a
reduced weight on excess M3 in the policy rule from the second quarter of 1994, implying that
excess money growth was effectively abandoned as a guide to intermediate policy (column 3 of
Table 7). The impact of capital inflows from July, 1994, with accumulated reserves unsterilised
until the following year (when monetary policy tightened sharply), is clear from the sharp rise in
excess M3, afterwards sustained at the new high level (Figure 1). As shown in  Aron and
Elbadawi (1999), there was a trade-off between monetary policy and exchange rate objectives in
the period, leading to a classic currency crisis early in 1996.30
5.   Summary and Policy Issues
Monetary policy in South Africa has been through major evolutionary changes, particularly in the
1980s, when there was extensive financial liberalisation, with monetary targeting initiated in
1986; and from 1998, with a move to inflation targeting. In this paper we have  modelled
extended Taylor interest policy rules from 1986-97 (using our forecasts of inflation and the
output gap to 1998 in the instrument set).
There are four key results. First, attempts to fit a Taylor rule extended for the lagged
dependent variable and the U.S. short-term interest rate, do not give sensible results.
Astonishingly, it appears that the SARB changed the interest rate perversely with lagged, current
or future inflation, with the estimated coefficients strongly significant.  Only by introducing
excess money growth and an indicator of financial liberalisation - both factors raised real interest
rates and happen to be negatively correlated with inflation over the sample - does the SARB’s
policy rule look more sensible.
Secondly, in the context of  liberalising credit and other financial markets, and the
international interest rate environment, the SARB used a rule with current inflation in its interest
rate policy formulation, despite claiming to focus largely on money growth targeting. The rule
appears to target inflation and to deemphasise the output gap. Future inflation has no weight
placed on it; this result is robust both for simple and sophisticated models of inflation forecasts,
and may have been influenced by the limited development of inflation forecasting models in the
SARB. Moreover, given the large structural changes in money and credit markets, the attempt to
target money probably led to worse output and inflation outcomes than if a more sensible version
of the Taylor rule been followed.
49
 The force of this last point is weakened, however, by the fact that policy had competing
preoccupations from late 1985, principally maintaining surpluses on the current account, given
the virtual cessation of capital inflows. Our third finding is on the relevance of structural breaks
                                                
49 The U.K. effectively abandoned monetary targeting by 1986, in large part because of the lack of stability in the
relationship between money growth and output, inflation and interest rates. By then it had been demonstrated in a
number of econometric studies, see for example, Hendry (1985), that inverting a money demand equation does not
give a sensible model of inflation – perhaps excepting countries with hyperinflation or budgetary problems so severe
that the authorities are tempted to resort to the inflation tax as a major source of revenue.31
related to the difficulty of managing large capital outflows during 1986-94 after the debt crisis,
and later, the large inflows following democratic elections in 1994, and the freeing of capital
controls on foreign investors. We find evidence that excess money growth is less important after
1994, and weak evidence that balance of payments concerns had some influence on monetary
policy during 1986-94.
Finally, even with the interpretation of the long-run coefficient on the inflation term given
in equation (8), the weight attached to inflation is below that found for policy rules in other
countries, or indeed, with pure inflation targeting. In Clarida et al (1998b), the finding is that
when inflation rose, the pre-1979 Federal Reserve raised interest rates by less than the rise in
inflation so that real interest rates fell (b is less than 1). After 1979, when inflation rose, real
interest rates rose, so that policy reaction was more anti-inflationary (b is greater than 1 – termed
“leaning against the wind”). For a range of countries, Clarida et al (1998a) found values for b of
1 or higher in the post 1979 period (e.g. b is 1.8 for the Federal Reserve, 2 for Japan and 1.3 for
the Bundesbank). We find weights in the region of 0.8 to 1.1 for b in South Africa, using non-
linear instrumental variables estimation for equation (7), section 4.1. One can accept the
hypothesis of a weight of 1 on the basis of standard errors. This suggests that controlling for
excess money, financial  liberalisation and the foreign interest rate, there was little “leaning
against the wind” by the central bank, but a real interest rate almost invariant with inflation. This
does not suggest a highly anti-inflationary stance after 1986, as has been claimed - although
clearly there were competing considerations concerning the balance of payments.32
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Table 1:  Monetary Policy Regimes
Years Monetary Policy Regime
1960-1981 Liquid asset ratio-based system with quantitative controls on
interest rates and credit
1981-1985 Mixed system during transition
1
1986-1998 Cost of cash reserves-based system with pre-announced monetary
targets (M3)
1998- Daily tenders of liquidity through repurchase transactions (repo
system), plus pre-announced M3 targets and targets for core
inflation
1.  Details in Appendix 2.
Table 2: A History of Money Growth and Inflation Targets
Year Money Growth Money Growth Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation
% Guidelines Actual Core “Target”
1 Total Core CPIX
1986 16-20 9.3 18.6
1987 14-18 17.6 16.1
1988 12-16 27.3 12.9
1989 14-18 22.3 14.7
1990 11-15 12.0 14.4
1991 8-12 12.3 15.3 18.9
1992 7-10 8.0 13.9 16.8
1993 6-9 7.0 9.7 12.6
1994 6-9 15.7 9.0 8.9
1995 6-10 15.2 8.7 7.9
1996 6-10 13.6 7.4 7.2
1997 6-10 17.2 8.6 8.8
1998 6-10 14.6 1-5 6.9 7.5 7.1
1999 6-10 10.2 1-5 5.2 7.9 6.9
SOURCE:  SARB Quarterly Bulletins
1.  Core targets were informally announced. Core inflation is overall CPI (metropolitan and other urban areas), excluding
certain food prices, interest costs, value-added tax and municipal rates. In February, 2000, a CPIX target was announced of
3-6 % for 2002, in the context of a new inflation targeting regime. CPIX inflation is overall CPI (metropolitan and other
urban areas), excluding interest rates on mortgage bonds.36











S.A. discount rate SARB Bank rate/100 0.144 2.76E-2 -3.43* -5.45**
U.S. T-bill rate 3 month U.S. T Bill
rate/100
5.46E-2 1.52E-2 -3.41* -5.19**
S.A. inflation Annual inflation rate
of the consumer
expenditure deflator






1.69E-3 1.36E-2 -3.77** -
Excess M3 growth Annual growth rate
of M3 less the annual
growth target rate
3.12E-2 4.96E-2 -4.97** -
FLIB Financial
liberalisation
measure - see text










- - - -
ZBOP The negative values
for the term
(current account
surplus to GDP(t-1) -
2 percent)
- - - -
a.  For a variable X, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) statistic is the t ratio on p from the regression: DXt = p
Xt-1 + Si=1,k qi DXt-i + y0 + y1t + et,  where k is the number of lags on the dependent variable, y0 is a
constant term, and t is a trend. The kth-order augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic is reported, where k is the last
significant lag of the 5 lags employed. The trend is included only if significant. For null order I(2), DX replaces
X in the equation above. Critical values are obtained from MacKinnon (1991).  Asterisks * and ** denote
rejection at 5% and 1% critical values.
b.  The stationarity tests are performed for the variables in levels before time-transformation i.e. before taking
moving averages and changes. For the variable, excess M3 growth, the sample for the stationarity tests is
1986:2-1997:4.
c.  The output gap measure is OUTGAP1.37
























Intercept 0.032 (4.0) 0.028 (4.1) 0.032 (3.5) 0.017 (3.3)
Discount rate (t-1) 0.830 (22.6) 0.852 (27.0) 0.809 (22.0) 0.889 (25.7)
US T-bill rate (t-1) 0.287 (4.2) 0.281 (3.7) 0.387 (4.9) 0.353 (2.8)
SA inflation -0.194 (5.8) -0.188 (5.6) -0.225 (4.9) -0.180 (5.3)
Output gap measure 0.365 (3.7) 0.373 (3.1) 0.424 (2.8) 0.281 (2.1)
Diagnostics
s.e 0.00552 0.00614 0.00682 0.00721
R
2
0.964 0.955 0.944 0.938
Adj.R
2
0.960 0.950 0.939 0.932
DW 2.40 2.42 1.84 1.72
LIML F tests 3.00 (r=0.010) 2.27 (r=0.041) 2.50 (r=0.020)
1.    Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses
1.  The output gap measure is OUTGAP1, the inflation forecasting equations are the more sophisticated models,
and the broad set of instruments is used.
2.  The instruments used for equations 2 to 4 are: the lagged financial liberalisation indicator, the lagged deviation
of annual M3 growth from target, one lag each of quarterly and annual inflation rates, two lags in the rate of
change in capacity utilisation, two lags in the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, and the lagged annual
growth rate of real private sector credit. For column 2 we added fitted values from our equations for annual
inflation and the output gap, using t-1 information. For column 3, we added the forecast value of the three
quarters-ahead annual SA inflation rate using t-1 information; and for column 4, we also added the forecast
value of the three quarters-ahead annual rate of growth of output using t-1 information.38
























Intercept 0.030 (4.0) 0.023 (5.0) 0.025 (3.6) 0.020 (4.9)
Discount rate (t-1) 0.801 (22.7) 0.815 (30.0) 0.798 (23.9) 0.822 (28.0)
US T-bill rate (t-1) 0.182 (2.5) 0.146 (1.2) 0.175 (1.6) 0.152 (1.3)
SA inflation -0.105 (-2.4) -0.055  (0.8) -0.066 (1.3) -0.050 (1.3)
Output gap measure 0.231 (2.3) 0.141 (1.0) 0.150 (1.4) 0.110 (1.3)
Excess M3 growth (t-1) 0.075 (2.9) 0.096 (4.1) 0.102 (4.7) 0.108 (5.6)
Diagnostics
s.e 0.00508 0.00537 0.00547 0.00553
R
2
0.970 0.966 0.965 0.964
Adj.R
2
0.966 0.962 0.961 0.960
DW 2.74 2.74 2.55 2.56
LIML F tests 2.08 (r=0.066) 1.22 (r=0.320) 1.18 (r=0.343)
Notes:
1.    Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses
2.  The output gap measure is OUTGAP1, the inflation forecasting equations are the more sophisticated models,
and the broad set of instruments is used.
3.  The instruments used for equations 2 to 4 are: the lagged financial liberalisation indicator, the lagged deviation
of annual M3 growth from target, one lag each of quarterly and annual inflation rates, two lags in the rate of
change in capacity utilisation, two lags in the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, and the lagged annual
growth rate of real private sector credit. For column 2 we added fitted values from our equations for annual
inflation and the output gap, using t-1 information. For column 3, we added the forecast value of the three
quarters-ahead annual SA inflation rate using t-1 information; and for column 4, we also added the forecast


















































Intercept 0.018 (2.1) 0.001 (0.16) 0.008 (0.9) 0.003 (0.6) 0.016 (2.4) 0.010 (1.6) 0.008 (1.3) 0.003 (0.4)
Discount rate (t-1) 0.457 (3.2) 0.320 (4.0) 0.421 (4.3) 0.326 (4.8) 0.595 (8.0) 0.645 (10.8) 0.633 (11.2) 0.583 (10.6)
US T-bill rate (t-1) 0.395(3.6) 0.399 (5.5) 0.367 (4.6) 0.417 (6.1) 0.297 (3.6) 0.249 (2.8) 0.248 (2.8) 0.243 (2.9)
SA inflation 0.059 (0.8) 0.234 (3.7) 0.151 (2.2) 0.192 (3.5) 0.029 (0.6) 0.068 (1.4) 0.084 (1.8) 0.148 (2.8)
Output gap 0.251 (2.6) 0.072 (0.6) 0.123 (1.2) 0.114 (1.8) 0.188 (2.1) 0.052(0.7) 0.040 (0.5) -0.022 (0.3)
Excess M3
Growth (t-1) 0.053 (2.1) 0.069 (3.3) 0.066 (3.3) 0.046 (2.2) 0.060 (2.6) 0.078 (3.8) 0.078 (3.8) 0.076 (3.6)
FLIB (t-1) 0.075 (2.5) 0.112 (5.7) 0.089 (3.8) 0.117 (6.5) 0.052 (2.9) 0.047 (2.9) 0.049 (3.2) 0.062 (4.0)
Diagnostics
s.e 0.00478 0.00432 0.00436 0.00414 0.00478 0.00494 0.00492 0.00496
R
2
0.974 0.979 0.978 0.980 0.974 0.972 0.972 0.972
Adj.R
2
0.970 0.976 0.975 0.978 0.970 0.968 0.968 0.968
DW 2.36 2.28 2.44 2.47 2.64 2.62 2.61 2.51
LIML F tests 2.30 (r=0.947) 0.56 (r=0.781) 0.84 (r=0.560)
1.    Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses
2.  Output gap measure is OUTGAP1, the inflation forecasting equation is the more sophisticated model, and a broad set of instruments is used, unless otherwise indicated.
3.  The instruments used for equations 2 to 4 are as in the preceding two tables; for column 4c, a narrower set of instruments is used (i.e. the exogenous or lagged variables
in the equation, forecast inflation and the forecast output gap, using t-1 information).
4.  Output gap measure is OUTGAP1, the simpler inflation forecasting equation and broad set of instruments are used.
5.  Output gap measure is OUTGAP2, the more sophisticated inflation forecasting equation and broad set of instruments are used.
6.  Output gap measure is OUTGAP1, the simpler inflation forecasting equation and broad set of instruments are used.
7.  Output gap measure is OUTGAP1, the simpler inflation forecasting equation and narrower set of instruments are used.40
















Intercept -0.002 (-0.47) -0.002 (0.0) 0.002 (0.4)
Discount rate (t-1) 0.306 (2.5) 0.315 (2.7) 0.276 (2.6)
US T-bill rate (t-1) 0.405 (4.9) 0.426 (5.9) 0.488 (6.4)
SA inflation 0.266 (3.7) 0.234 (2.9) 0.207 (2.4)
Excess M3 growth (t-1) 0.078 (4.3) 0.076 (4.2) 0.078 (4.3)
FLIB (t-1) 0.116 (4.3) 0.111 (4.1) 0.124 (5.3)
ZBOP - -0.162 (-1.3) -
DumANC*Excess
M3 growth
- - -0.094 (1.8)
Diagnostics







DW 2.20 2.37 2.38
Notes:
1.  Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses
2.  The estimations employ the narrow set of instruments (see Table 6), and the more sophisticated inflation model.41
























1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 










































outgap1=log(output) dev. from trend1 SARB bank rate/100
change in log (consumer deflator) outgap2=log(output) dev. from trend243













































US Tbill rate SA prime rate SA gov. bond yield44













































financial liberalisation indicator real prime rate/100
ann. real priv. sector credit growth45



































Z=curr. acc. deficit/GDP-3% ZBOP = negative values of Z46
Appendix Table 1: Financial Liberalisation in South Africa 1960-97
______________________________________________________________________________________
A.   LIBERALISATION OF INTEREST RATES
______________________________________________________________________________________
Deposit Rate Controls:
Mar. 65-Jul. 66 Upper limits first imposed on rate of interest payable on bank and building society deposits
Dec. 69 Reintroduced at 7% per annum




i. Clearing banks prime rates for overdraft:
before 1967 Minimum and prime overdraft lending rates set by agreement with the SARB at 1.5 and 2% above the
Bank rate
1967-mid-75 Min. and prime overdraft lending rates set at at 2 and 2.5% above the Bank rate
Jul. 75 A newly defined prime rate ("the lowest rate at which a clearing bank will lend on overdraft") set by
individual banks within the margins 2.5-3.5% above the Bank rate (changes to be discussed first with
the SARB)
16 Feb. 82 Banks released from obligation of keeping prime rate within specific limits (still had to inform the
SARB of intended prime rate changes)
ii. Loan and credit transactions:
Maxima have been in force since before the 1960s in terms of various Usury and Finance Acts. Maximum finance charge
rates are now linked to clearing banks' prime rates by formula, for various categories of money loan and credit and leasing
transactions.
iii. Mortgage rate:
Informal constraints were removed only in the early 1980s
______________________________________________________________________________________
B.    DIRECTED CREDIT
______________________________________________________________________________________
Nov. 65 Total of discounts and advances by monetary banking institutions to the private sector restricted to the
level of such credit on 31 Mar. 65
Dec. 66 Ceiling reduced to 92.5% of the Mar. 65 level
Aug. 67 "Voluntary" control made mandatory by proclamation
May 68 Extend ceilings to cover bank investment in private sector securities
Aug. 70 Extend to non-monetary banks to curb competition
Sep. 72 Intention announced to phase out ceilings, but raised them by 7.5%
Nov. 72 Credit ceilings abolished
Feb 76 Credit ceilings reimposed for bank credit to the private sector
77-80 Further tightened ceilings at various points
Aug. 80 Credit ceilings finally withdrawn
______________________________________________________________________________________
C.    CASH RESERVE AND LIQUID ASSET  REQUIREMENTS
______________________________________________________________________________________
Liquid Asset Requirements:
Liquid asset requirements were used as the principal monetary policy instrument fom 1960 through mid-1982. Details
from the maximum ratios reached in early 1980:
Aug. 80 Two categories of banks: e.g. Cat. A: 58% (ST), 35% (MT), 5% (LT)
27 Sep. 82 Two categories of banks: e.g. Cat. A: 54% (ST), 34% (MT), 5% (LT)
19 Jul. 83 All banks the same % liabilities: 48% (ST), 28% (MT), 5% (LT)
20 Sep. 83 All banks the same % liabilities: 40% (ST), 20% (MT), 5% (LT)
8 Dec. 83 All banks the same % liabilities: 30% (ST), 20% (MT), 5% (LT)
14 Mar. 84 All banks the same % liabilities: 25% (ST), 18% (MT), 5% (LT)
29 Mar 85 All banks the same % liabilities: 22% (ST), 16% (MT), 5% (LT)47
31 Aug. 85 New method to calculate ST liabilities results in a larger calculated amount of such liabilities. All
banks: 20% (ST), 15% (MT), 5% (LT) liabilities
Feb 91 Definition of ST liabilities extended to include repurchase agreements and other liabilities not
previously included. All banks: 20% ST liabilities
Apr. 93 Certain types of assets (e.g. banker's acceptances) lose liquid asset status. All banks: 5% total liabilities
Cash Reserve Requirements:
Start to be lowered from March 1982. Details from the early 1980s:
11 Apr. 80 Two classes of banks: e.g. A: Basic: 8% (ST, non-i bearing); Additional: 7% (ST, non-i bearing), 5%
(MT, i bearing with NFC)
12 Sep. 80 Two classes of banks: e.g. A: Basic: 8% (ST, non-i bearing); Additional:10% (ST, non-i bearing), 3%
(MT, non-i bearing),  2% (MT, i bearing with NFC)
31 Mar. 82 Two classes of banks: e.g. A: Basic: 8% (ST, non-i bearing); Additional: 4% (ST, non-i bearing), 3%
(MT, non-i bearing),  2% (MT, i bearing)
27 Sep. 82 All banks: Basic: 8% (ST, non-i bearing); Additional: 2% (ST, non-i bearing), 2% (MT, i bearing with
the National Finance Corporation (NFC))
30 Sep. 83 All banks only Basic requirements: 8% (ST, non-i bearing) 2% (MT, non-i bearing),  2% (MT, i bearing
with NFC)
15 Mar. 84 All banks: 8% (ST, non-i bearing) 2% (MT, non-i bearing)
31 Jul. 85 Bank's vault cash included in cash reserves
1 Apr. 86 All banks: 5% (ST, non-i bearing) 2% (MT, non-i bearing)
1 Feb. 91 All banks: 4% (ST, non-i bearing)
21 Jul. 92 All banks: 4% (ST, non-i bearing); additional  1% (ST, i bearing)
26 Apr.93 All banks: 3% (ST, non-i bearing); additional  1% (ST, i bearing)
Aug. 93 All banks: 1.5% (ST, non-i bearing) 1% all other liabilities; additional  1% (ST, i bearing)
______________________________________________________________________________________
D.    COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
______________________________________________________________________________________
28 Feb. 83 Register of Co-operation (ROCO) ended: this was an agreement among commercial banks which
limited competition.
1983 Few  new banking institutions stablished prior to 1980. From 1983, a substantial  number of new banks
were allowed to start operations (1980:50, 1989:60)
Takeovers and mergers:
1989 Nedbank and SA Permanent Society merge to form Nedperm Bank
1991 United, Volskas and Allied Societies form ABSA
1992 ABSA takes over Bankorp (leaves 4 major banking groups)
1994 onwards Foreign banks enter SA
Financial innovation:
1990s Credit cards; "Access Bonds" where households can borrow against housing collateral; pension assets
can be used as collateral for mortgage lending
______________________________________________________________________________________
E.    SUPERVISORY/PRUDENTIAL REGULATORY CHANGES
______________________________________________________________________________________
1986 Building Society Act, 1986: Tax benefits and other advantages giving building societies a monopoly of
the mortgage market are phased out.
1988 Amendments to banking and building society legislation enacted in 1988 made cash reserve and liquid
asset requirements the same for each. Previously building societies required no cash reserve
requirements against liabilities to the public, substantially lower liquid asset requirements and no
supplementary liquid asset requirements.
1990 Deposit-taking Institutions Act of 1990: Banks & building societies brought under the same legislation,
save for small mutual building society sector (covered by separate Act)
______________________________________________________________________________________
F.    EXCHANGE RATE LIBERALISATION
______________________________________________________________________________________
1961-1975 Fixed exchange rate regimes of various types48
Sep 22 1975 The Rand is devalued 17.85 percent: the new rate is R1.00=$1.15.
Jan 24 1979         A two-tier exchange rate system established: official rate renamed the Commercial Rand and put on a
controlled float, applicable to foreign trade, authorised capital transfers and current payments including
remittance of dividend and interest payments. Free-floating Financial Rand applicable to non-residents'
financial transactions, incl. FDI, repatriation of capital and profits,and outward capital transfers by
residents and emigrants.  
Feb 7 1983           Dual exchange rates are unified to a controlled float of an Effective Rand.
Sep 2 1985           Two-tier system is re-established, with Commercial and Financial Rands.
Mar 1995 The dual rates are finally unified in a "managed" float
______________________________________________________________________________________
G.    CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION
______________________________________________________________________________________
Non-residents
Mar 1995 The dual rates are unified (abolition of all controls on the transactions of non-residents)
June, 1996 Local borrowing limit for 100% foreign investors is doubled to 100% of effective capital
Residents:
13 July 95 Institutional investors are allowed to swap up to 5% of their total assets with foreign investors
(insurance companies, pension funds and unit trusts)
June, 1996 The limit on institutional investors for asset swaps is raised to 10%
June, 1996 Financial institutions can place up to 3% of 1995 cash flows abroad in 1996 by end-1996, and easier
forex access for corporations wishing to invest in neighbouring states
June, 1996 Exports still have to be repatriated within 7 days, but can offset forex needs for imports within 30 days.
October, 1996 Authorised foreign exchange dealers foreign exchange cash limits doubled to $1.5 billion (since April,
1996 had been allowed to exceed these limits).
March 12, 1997  Reforms announced in Budget speech, effective from July 1997 include:
- Corporates can transfer up to R30 million per new investment to countries outside the Common
Monetary Area, & up to R50 million per new investment in SADC countries
-Firms can raise off-shore financing based on balance sheet strength of their parent co.’s
-Long-term insurers, pension funds and unit trusts authorized - in addition to swap facilities previously
sanctioned - to transfer capital abroad in 1997 equal to 3% of net inflow of funds to these institutions
during 1996, with overall limit of 10% of total assets to be held in foreign-currency denominated
securities
- Qualifying institutional investors allowed to invest 2% of net domestic income surpluses during 1996
in securities listed on stock exchanges in the SADC member countries, subject to the overall limit of
10% of total assets.
______________________________________________________________________________________
SOURCE: Categories from Bandieri et al (2000). De Kock Commission (1985); SARB Quarterly Bulletins; Money and
Banking Statistics of South Africa: 1970-92.
1. Note: adjustments to deposit and lending rates were made at various times to the maximum rates and various classes of
intermediaries and liabilities subject to these controls, and coverage and level of credit ceilings was also adjusted on
several occasions.
2. Details on the foreign exchange market from Aron et al (2000).
3. Discussion of different monetary policy regimes, including the use of explicit monetary targets (later “guidelines”) from
mid-1986, is given in the text.Documentos de Trabajo
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